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‘Translating the Terrain’ over 
Cultural Myths and Mistaken Assumptions 
BY MARJORIE CORMAN AARON 
“To know another’s language and not his cul-
ture is a very good way to make a fluent fool of 
yourself.” 
—Winston Brembeck 
* * * 
How is it that a lawyermay scrupulously avoidtechnical terms or styl-
ized usage when describing legal
concepts, and still leave his client
wandering between entirely lost and
somewhat uncertain as to the intended
message?
Why might a lawyer’s pretty-darned-clear 
explanation of a twist in litigation or legal 
impediment to a transaction still yield client 
puzzlement or incredulity? 
Stepping back from words and phrases, 
lawyers must recognize that, outside of the 
legal practice, people lack shared knowledge 
about its workings. Thus, the “lawyer-trans-
lator” must supply basic, missing knowledge 
of legal process, practice, and culture for her 
words to make sense. Without some of that 
knowledge, the lawyer’s words lack meaning. 
In “Meaning-Based Translation: A Guide
to Cross-Language Equivalence,” translation
theorist Prof. Mildred Larson writes that
translation “consists of studying the lexi-
con, grammatical structure, communication
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situation and cultural context of the source
language text, analyzing it in order to deter-
mine its meaning, and then reconstructing
this same meaning using the lexicon and
grammatical structure which are appropriate
in the RECEPTOR LANGUAGE and its
cultural context.”
To explain this academic jar-
gon (irony noted): when a transla-
tor listens to French and translates 
into English, French is the source 
language, and English is the receptor 
language. 
The most adept translators are equally
comfortable in the “source” language as in 
the “receptor” language. Some theorists ar-
gue that the best translators are those whose 
mother tongue was the receptor language. If 
so, assuming lawyer and client are both flu-
ent in English (or any other shared language), 
translating from “legalese” as source language 
to the lay person’s “receptor” language would 
seem simple enough. After all, no lawyer’s na-
tive language was legalese: we picked that up 
in law school. 
Still, at least three types of problems arise 
for the lawyer-as-translator: 
(1) Words or phrases with “no meaning
or uncertain meaning” to his client, absent 
definition. 
(2) Words or phrases with “non-synony-
mous” meanings—the client understands them 
to mean something different than their mean-
ing in a legal context. 
(3) Words or phrases containing embed-
ded, unrecognized concepts. 
Most lawyers acknowledge the need to
avoid legalese with clients or, at least, to define 
unavoidable legal language or terms of art. 
Unfortunately, the law school experience that 
so famously transforms thinking also seems 
to erase memories of what nonlawyers don’t 
know and won’t understand: “We will face a 
summary judgment motion. … We’ll have to 
prove scienter. … The motion in limine is a 
threat. … Dictum isn’t dispositive but it is wor-
risome. … Discovery is burdensome. … Jury 
nullification isn’t likely.” 
It is quite astonishing to hear second-year 
law students’ efforts to describe legal concepts 
to a client. Phrases such as “material facts” and 
“dispositive motions” fill the air. Just one year 
after matriculation, they have lost awareness 
of the gaps in knowledge now separating them 
from lay clients. Paradoxically then, law school 
may graduate lawyers newly competent in law 
and newly incompetent at insuring their clients 
are fully informed. 
Perhaps because legalese and “native”
non-lawyer speech both occur within English, 
boundaries between the two are more difficult 
to remember and recognize. If I am translating 
between French and English, or English and 
German, I just don’t confuse what are English 
words and what are German or French words. 
(Even though I am not fluent in either Ger-
man or French, and may fail to retrieve the 
necessary words for translation, I do remember 
which is which.) 
In contrast, when lawyers or any profes-
sionals “translate” into lay language, they are 
apt to forget which words, phrases, and con-
cepts were learned within their profession. So, 
computer programmers speak of java code, 
and busses, and RAM; doctors speak of his-
tamine reactions, pathologies, and REM; and 
lawyers speak of motion practice, SEC 10b-5, 
standing, and jurisdiction. 
They all seem perplexed by the others’ 
confusion. 
To translate effectively, the lawyer must re-
member or “refresh his recollection” of pre-law 
school language and thought. Be mindful of 
words you wouldn’t have known. If you must 
use them—the client must be told “a summary 
judgment motion has been filed”—make sure 
you define and explain carefully. 
(continued on next page) 























(continued from previous page) 
Consider this “parable” of two cooking 
translation challenges involving an accom-
plished caterer, with a well-equipped kitchen 
and capable staff. He must prepare only au-
thentic French menu items for two different 
dinner parties. (He cannot serve the same 
French meal twice.) Internet research yielded 
a plethora of recipes for signature dishes of 
famous French chefs. The recipes are cryptic— 
listing ingredients and sparse instructions— 
and entirely in French. 
For the first dinner, the caterer forwards 
the recipes to a French professor friend, who 
translates them into English and emails them 
back, with the message “Good luck.” Does the 
entertainer caterer need luck? Not really. He 
will select wisely from among the many reci-
pes, capably oversee cooking, baking, and tim-
ing challenges, and pull off a wonderful French 
meal. He knows the process. 
For the second dinner, the caterer asks his 
French-speaking niece, who knows nothing 
about cooking, to first select a recipe for each 
course and then translate them into English. 
How can the niece make wise selections? She 
can’t tell which finished flavors work well
together. She doesn’t know the process of
cooking or baking or time requirements for 
different preparations. Language alone is not 
enough. The caterer will need a lot of luck. 
Moving from French cooking to the moral 
for lawyers and clients: To be informed enough 
to make wise choices, a client may need to un-
derstand the workings of law, the legal system, 
and legal process. Yet many clients are unaware 
of basic legal impediments, such as motions 
to dismiss and for summary judgment, stat-
utes of limitation, privileges, or evidentiary 
privileges and preclusions. They have little
experience with the uncertainty of procedural 
twists or unanticipated legal tactics. They are 
shocked by the power of civil procedure’s
discovery phase to intrude on their lives and 
businesses, gaining access to files, financial 
records, medical records, and ancient email. 
They are dismayed at their inability to control 
the cost of reciprocal discovery obligations, the 
cost of counsel’s time to respond to motions or 
prepare for depositions, or the cost of retain-
ing an expert. They may be surprised to learn 
that one’s own damaging information must be 
sought and then provided to the other side. 
They don’t know how the system works. 
MISSING LINKS AND 
LEGAL CONCEPTS 
In less time than it takes to type the words, here 
is an entirely incomplete list of things lawyers 
know about litigation that most clients do not: 
•	 To file suit, you need to establish jurisdic-
tion. 
•	 Jurisdiction is. … 
Explain yourself 
The discussion: Communicating with 
clients. 
The problem: legalese. Jargon. 
And, yes, potentially, your law school 
education. 
The assignment: Unraveling the
uncertainty conveyed by some of the
precise language you use as a matter
of habit, practice and convenience. 
•	 Requirements of notice pleading are differ-
ent than pleading with particularity. 
•	 If you don’t answer a complaint filed
against you, a [default] judgment eventu-
ally will be entered. 
•	 Cases can be dismissed by judges, without 
any jury involvement. 
•	 A “motion to the court” can be made by 
either side. It is initiated by filing a writ-
ten document and is a vehicle for par-
ties—through lawyers—to ask the judge to 
take certain actions. When one side files a 
motion, the other side always has an op-
portunity to respond in opposition. 
•	 Judges hear lawyers’ arguments but clients
cannot testify in most hearings on motions. 
•	 A preliminary injunction can tie up your 
business for quite a while even though you 
haven’t had a trial yet. 
•	 Pre-trial discovery is expensive, long, and 
unavoidable. 
•	 In discovery, the other side has a right to 
obtain your documents. 
•	 In our system, the judges determine the 
law, and juries decide facts when the par-
ties disagree about the facts. Unless you 
disagree about facts that are necessary to 
make a legal determination, there is no 
need for a jury. 
•	 Law derives not only from what is “on the 
books” as passed by a legislature, it also is 
found in judicial decisions case law. 
•	 When deciding the law in a case, judges are 
bound to follow appropriate precedent—to 
be consistent with what other courts have 
done in similar circumstances. Doctrine is 
a definitive rule derived from consistent 
reasoning and often named and articulated 
in judicial opinions. 
•	 In most cases, in the United States, the 
winner bears his own legal costs. 
•	 Not every case can eventually go to the 
Supreme Court. 
•	 Scienter means. … Fraud means. … Both 
can be challenging to prove—and must be 
proven. 
•	 Anticipated lost profits from a deal may 
not be the measure of damages. 
•	 Conflicts of law is a course unto itself. 
•	 The same case can involve state and federal 
law; their application is not always obvious. 
•	 An oral contract can be enforceable (absent 
Statute of Frauds protection). 
•	 The Statute of Frauds makes it impossible 
to enforce many oral contracts. 
•	 The judge can dismiss a case (on a j.n.o.v.) 
even if the jury found liability. 
•	 Judges have discretionary power to reduce 
a jury’s damages award. 
•	 Litigation is slow. Depending upon the ju-
risdiction, the initial pleading and motion
stage can take six months, with comple-
tion of discovery and dispositive or pre-
trial motions another year to 18 months
(or more or less), and a first trial date a
year (or more or less) after that. Courts
often postpone calendared cases. When
you sue a company, no matter how much
you “win,” you can only recover up to
the value of its assets—after mortgages,
etc.—even if the owner is rich. (Once
explained, “piercing the corporate veil” is
not automatic.) 
•	 Appellate courts uphold lower courts’ rul-
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•	 After winning a verdict, collecting the
award takes time, and it may require ad-
ditional expense to acquire the assets. 
Assume a lawyer trying to explain summa-
ry judgment risk to a client who knows none 
of the bullet point information listed above. He 
begins with the words: “The defense will file a 
motion for summary judgment with the court, 
arguing that there are no disputed issues of ma-
terial fact and that we cannot prevail at trial.” 
What meaning will that explanation have, and 
what questions will it raise? 
First, the client doesn’t know what a motion
is, and she doesn’t know what a “material fact”
is. Assume she asks for definitions, and the law-
yer translates those words within the sentence
by saying: “The defense will file a document, a
piece of paper with the court, called a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that there are
no disputed issues on any facts that are impor-
tant, and saying that we cannot prevail—win— 
at trial, and so the court should prevent the case
from going forward.”
Now, the client may understand that the 
defense will do something involving “arguing” 
to “the court” and that the other side wants to 
stop him from winning, of course. But when 
you take this sentence and overlay it on her 
incomplete knowledge, she still would not
understand that: 
•	 “To the court” means to a judge and not 
to a jury; 
•	 You will of course be arguing against it; 
•	 “Arguing” will also likely involve writing a 
lengthy document, and that will be expen-
sive (unless this is a contingency fee case); 
•	 She will not have the chance to “get on a 
witness stand and tell her story” unless her 
case “survives” the motion; 
•	 If she loses on that motion there will be no 
trial and she will collect nothing (on the 
plaintiff ’s side), or she will be obligated to 
pay (on the defense side), and 
•	 Even though her physical or financial
harms are undeniably real, a judge could 
indeed conclude her case is not winnable 
at trial. 
Even a client who understands the words 
may not glean from them any sense of the steps 
that will have to be taken, the reasons why, or 
the potential impact. For the words to have 
meaning, the lawyer must supply information 
about the underlying layer of process, rules, 
legal reasoning, and convention, piece by piece. 
NO SCRIPTED ANSWERS 
We accept that the lawyer’s task is to translate 
language describing legal circumstances suf-
ficiently to achieve the elusive “fully informed 
client.” But must all explanations of legal pro-
cess include every possible twist, turn, and 
consequence, no matter how remote? How 
much information is too much? 
Completely eliminating the knowledge im-
balance could take quite a while. Law school 
was three long years. Must a lawyer antici-
pate, recite, and dispel every myth? Is there 
a prescribed way for a lawyer to make these 
judgments? 
But how could there be? Each client comes 
to the table with different capacities, engage-
ment, and levels of curiosity. 
Find the Foundation and Build There: It
would be foolish for an architect to design 
living space without knowing whether the
project is a renovation or new construction, 
or without having seen the foundation or the 
site. So, before explaining legal circumstances 
to a client, a lawyer is wise to learn something 
about that client’s familiarity with law and the 
legal process terrain. 
As early as the initial client meeting or 
interview, ask your client about any past ex-
perience with lawyers and the legal system. 
Both what that experience was and the way she 
speaks about it will provide insight into her fa-
cility with legal concepts and processes. If you 
didn’t ask in earlier meetings, consider raising 
the question in a general, friendly way before 
focusing on explanation of legal circumstances 
in the client counseling session. 
A word of caution: do not assume that 
college education, age, or general business
experience give rise to a sophisticated client. 
Highly accomplished and intelligent people
sometimes know astonishingly little about the 
legal system—astonishing to lawyers, at least. 
Too often, when meeting with a profes-
sional client dressed in a suit and possessing an 
impressive title or resume, the lawyer assumes 
too much knowledge. It’s natural. After all, the 
client looks and speaks much like the lawyer’s 
colleagues: They appear to be from the same 
“speech community,” which can be defined as 
noting that common language is not neces-
sarily sufficient for clear communications in 
a social group with shared understanding of 
grammar and rules for its use. 
The opposite is also true: clients who do 
not appear highly educated or worldly may be 
quite aware of the way the legal system works. 
Some cab drivers study philosophy; a wait-
ress may be an astronomy geek. Your grocery 
produce manager client may have helped his 
sister study for the bar. He may be an ardent 
environmentalist who follows Environmental 
Defense Fund litigation. You just never know. 
Credit and Climb onto the Client’s Under-
standing: Knowing a client’s general experience 
with the legal terrain helps a lawyer make ini-
tial judgments about when translation is nec-
essary, and what types of words to choose. To 
ensure a fully informed client on legal circum-
stances and choices faced in this matter, there’s 
no harm in the lawyer asking what the client 
has already gleaned. Imagine that depositions 
and other discovery are done. The lawyer sets 
up a meeting to discuss the status of the litiga-
tion and possible settlement. 
The lawyer might ask: “Could you tell me 
what you understand about where we are in the 
process? I don’t want to take your time explain-
ing what you already know.” 
One client might respond: 
I think discovery is done because there’s no 
one else to depose and everyone has every-
one else’s documents. Based upon the last 
time, I assume we’ll file something to try 
to get rid of this case. If that doesn’t work, 
trial is still a long time away. I also know 
there’s a tactical question about whether 
we should look at settling now, or after we 
file that thing. And from the company’s 
perspective, settling or not may have other 
repercussions. 
A different client might say: 
I hope we’re done with talking in confer-
ence rooms with stenographers, because 
I’m hoping you’re going to tell me the trial 
will be soon and we have to get ready. 
Whichever client is yours that day, you will 
have gained valuable clues on where and how 
to communicate effectively. 
(continued on next page) 



































(continued from previous page) 
THE ‘UNDER-ARMOR 
OF FALSE BELIEF’ 
Clients who inhabit our civic culture of high 
school government courses, television legal
dramas, movies, and literary epics may share 
myths and false beliefs about the legal system. 
This complicates lawyers’ communication with 
clients. 
The lawyer must anticipate and address 
those culturally-created myths and false be-
liefs. Otherwise, whenever the lawyer’s ex-
planation and analysis contradict them, the 
client may have great difficulty understanding, 
accepting, or integrating what the lawyer has 
said. Here are some common myths, and often 
false beliefs: 
•	 The legal system is always fair. Results are 
just. 
•	 A trial reveals the REAL truth. 
•	 In this country, we all have a right to our 
day in court and to be heard by a jury. 
•	 Juries always vote for the honorable party. 
A jury decision is always fair and right. 
•	 Because I have been sued, my name and 
honor have been damaged. My record is 
tarnished. The world will know. When I 
win, my name and honor will be restored. 
•	 If I sue and win at trial, the other side’s 
name and reputation will be ruined. The 
world will know. I have the power to injure! 
•	 People can win millions of dollars in pu-
nitive damages whenever the other side 
deserves to be punished. 
•	 No jury would award punitive damages 
against my company if we didn’t intention-
ally do anything wrong. 
•	 I can always appeal—all the way to the 
Supreme Court. 
Unmindful of the client’s “under-armor of false 
belief,” the frustrated lawyer moans: “I’ve ex-
plained the realities to my client until I’m blue 
in the face. He just doesn’t get the picture, or he 
doesn’t want to get it. It’s as if he doesn’t care, or 
he’s just oblivious!” 
The lawyer has indeed painstakingly,
clearly, and carefully explained his analysis
of the legal issues and the evidence. The cli-
ent seems finally to understand the analysis,
but it is without impact. The armor of myth
and belief was neither addressed nor pen-
etrated. “It’s as if he’s intent on walking off a
cliff,” laments the lawyer or mediator, shak-
ing his head. 
In fact, myths often shape the way people
understand the world and their own story
within it. Heroic myths are particularly strong
and cross-cultural, including the notion of
hero as warrior. See Joseph Campbell, “The
Hero With a Thousand Faces,” 334–341 (2nd




Imagine a 50-year-old business owner whose 
company is accused of gender discrimination 
in its initial demotion and then termination of 
a mid-level female manager named Sally. 
The owner was involved in the termination 
decision, based on a regional vice president’s 
recommendation. The VP was a loyal mem-
ber of the senior management team and the 
owner’s long-time golf buddy. 
The business owner’s lawyer has explained 
that the patterns of hiring, firing, and promot-
ing women in the region over the past 10 years, 
revealed in discovery, may appear not to favor 
women, and that his VP acknowledged having 
made remarks such as “These gals just don’t 
put out hard work like the guys do. They play 
too much with their kids.” 
And: “Sally doesn’t fit in with the team; she 
bitches and moans about nitpicky details, and 
she reminds me of my mother.” 
The regional vice president has stead-
fastly denied any biases and maintains that
Sally really was a problem—all of the other
(mostly male) department members will
testify to that. 
The business owner strongly believes that 
his VP is a decent, honorable man who had on-
ly the business’s best interests in mind. When 
his lawyer explains that on this evidence, plus 
the testimony of the plaintiff and her witnesses, 
a jury might well find gender discrimination, 
the business owner may hear the words but 
flatly reject the idea of risk that any jury will 
doubt his VP’s credibility. 
He has an abiding faith that the jury will 
find the real truth and vote for the good guys
and he knows in his heart of hearts that he 
and his VP are the good guys. The jury will 
(magically?) be able to separate fact from fic-
tion and therefore will see that Sally really was 
incompetent and uncooperative and deserved 
to be terminated. 
The idea of punitive damages will not
cause concern for a nanosecond because, even 
if the statistics are awkward, the owner’s testi-
mony will explain them. He would never have 
been intentionally unfair to any employee. 
Myth or fantasy, plaintiffs who feel
wronged by more powerful actors believe their 
lawsuit has the power to ruin the other side, 
or power to make them take notice and regret 
what they have done. Theoretically, if a large 
dollar verdict would bankrupt the other side, 
it might be true. 
But in a single plaintiff and corporate de-
fendant context, the plaintiff sometimes envi-
sions public damage—vindication of his public 
“record” and ruinous public image damage to 
the other. 
Indeed, that vision—mostly mirage—may
be an important motivation for taking legal
action. It is an attempt to equalize power im-
balance, to become a threat, to let the world
know of the wrongs committed. Some lawyers
are faithful to these myths and see themselves
as crusading warriors, and thus help to build
the illusion that a public trial will topple the
powerful and achieve heroic vindication. Yet
this is the stuff of grand movies, and rarely
of reality. 
Grounded in experience and evidence,
most lawyers become astonished or frustrated 
when their clients turn deaf ears to concerns 
about practical financial interests. As a media-
tor, I often witness a lawyer’s incredulity and 
concern at her client’s “irrational” rejection of 
a significant settlement in favor of waiting for 
trial and risking a low or zero-dollar verdict. 
That lawyer may have learned that the client 
deeply desires to resurrect his good name and 
ruin the other’s. 
All too often, however, the lawyer fails to 
recognize the strength of the client’s underly-
ing belief that his legal action has the power 
to do so. Unless that belief is addressed and 
discussed, the client will cling to negotiating 
positions that cause his lawyer to shake her 
head in disbelief.
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